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weibull@bu.edu.Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics
1. Introduction
It is a commonplace that social insurance, like other insurance schemes, is exposed to
moral hazard and, hence, to free riding. One reason is that it is diﬃcult for insurance
providers to formulate objective criteria that can discriminate between individuals
with bad luck, ”deserving beneﬁciaries”, and free riders, ”undeserving beneﬁciaries”.
The free-riding problem may be mitigated by lower beneﬁt levels. To some ex-
tent, however, this would undermine the very purpose of insurance. Social norms
against living oﬀ beneﬁts may also mitigate free-riding. One strength of social norms
in this respect is that those who enforce the norms are probably close to the indi-
vidual. Since they are often better informed about the circumstances underlying the
beneﬁt dependency than an administrator in the social insurance system they can
more easily identify undeserving beneﬁciaries. Moreover, the enforcement of norms
is not constrained by formal rules and procedures which must be followed by public-
sector administrators. Individuals who deviate from work norms are discomforted
by ”shame”, emanating from the disapproval of others, or by ”guilt” when they in-
ternalize the norm. For these reasons, we would expect work norms under certain
1Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics 2
circumstances to be quite eﬀective in limiting the number of individuals who inten-
tionally live on beneﬁts.1 There are, however, disadvantages and limitations of relying
on social norms in this context. One, of course, is that a norm may erode over time
in response to a rising number of beneﬁciaries.
In a previous paper (Lindbeck, Nyberg, Weibull, 1999), LNW for short, we ex-
amined the interaction between economic incentives and endogenous work norms in
the context of redistributive transfer programs among individuals with diﬀerent pro-
ductivities. Here, we instead focus on income insurance and the possibility that some
individuals with a relatively high valuation of leisure choose to free ride on the social
insurance system. To highlight this issue, we assume that all individuals have the
same productivity but diﬀer in their valuation of leisure. Another diﬀerence com-
pared to the LNW is that we now emphasize dynamic aspects of the problem. As
in the LNW paper, however, we assume that individuals make two type of decisions:
an economic decision concerning whether to participate in the labor market or not,
and a political decision as a voter concerning the generosity of the beneﬁt program.
As has been shown before, (for example in LNW), endogenous norms may generate
multiple equilibria in economic decisions.
We focus primarily on the case where those who participate in the labor market
constitute a majority of the population and we examine their voting with respect to
the generosity of the social insurance system. One question is to determine the degree
of generosity in social insurance systems that will be chosen by a majority of voters
and how this decision is aﬀected by the presence of social norms. Another question
relates to the possibility that social norms exhibit inertia. For instance, it would be
interesting to know how is the outcome of the political equilibrium aﬀected by time
lags in the adjustment of the strength of the social norm.
2. The model
There is a continuum of individuals. All individuals are a priori identical in every
aspect except their valuation of leisure.2 To highlight the incentives to draw on social
insurance beneﬁts we assume that individuals face a binary choice of whether to look
1There has been a vivid discussion on whether peoples attitudes toward social insurance and
redistribution diﬀer depending on whether poverty is a result of bad luck or low eﬀort. These
groups are often referred to as ”deserving” and ”undeserving” poor respectively. Bowles and Gintis
(2000) argue that individuals, for reasons of reciprocity, are more willing to support poor of the ﬁrst
category than the second. Bowles, Fong and Gintis (2001) have found empirical support for this
hypotesis based on both experimental data and opinion polls on attitudes towards redistribution.
Similar conlusions are reached in a study by Fong (2001) based on opinion polls.
2In their analysis of welfare stigma, Besely and Coate (1992) assume that the valuation of leisure
varies across individuals. However, unlike here, they are not concerned with political equilibrium,
they rule out the possibility of multiple equilibria, and do not focus on dynamic aspects.Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics 3
for a job or to live oﬀ social security beneﬁts. Those who look for a job face a ﬁxed and
given risk ρ of becoming unemployed. By thus assuming that the unemployment risk
is exogenous, we in eﬀect assume that each individual’s choice of his or her probability
of being employed is restricted to two values, 1−ρ for those who decide to look for a
job, and zero for those who decide to live oﬀ the government beneﬁt. (Lindbeck and
Nyberg, 2001, develop a model where the employment probability is instead chosen
from a continuum.). Let x be the non-employment rate in the economy, the ”beneﬁt
rate” for short. The beneﬁciaries belong to two distinct categories in this model: those
who exert eﬀort to look for a job, but do not succeed or lose their jobs (the “deserving”
beneﬁciaries), and those who do not look for a job (the “undeserving” beneﬁciaries).
Those who do not look for a job suﬀer a disutility (or stigma) by deviating from the
norm. As in LNW, we assume that the disutility is smaller if more people live oﬀ the
transfer. The strength of the social norm thus depends on the beneﬁt rate x.3 The
absence of a social norm, as in traditional economic analyses, will appear as a special
case.
Let w>0 be the going wage rate in a perfectly competitive labour market, that
is, w is the constant marginal productivity of every employed worker. Those who do
not work receive a per-capita lump-sum transfer T>0 from the government. Let
τ ∈ (0,1) be the tax rate on labour income used to ﬁnance the lump-sum transfer
payments. The real wage is normalized to unity. The preferences of individuals are
assumed to be represented by
u =
￿
(1 − ρ)[αln(1 −τ) − β]+ραln T if looking for a job
αlnT − γ otherwise (1)
where α>0, −∞ <β<+∞, γ ≥ 0 and 0 <ρ<1. Here α is the utility
weight placed on consumption, β the weight on leisure, a weight which varies between
individuals (negative for those who prefer to work even in the absence of economic
and social incentives to do so), and γ is the weight placed on norm adherence.4
The population distribution of the parameter β is given by a cumulative distribution
function Φ with positive density on the whole real line.
All individuals simultaneously choose whether to look for a job or not. When an
individual makes this decision, he or she treats the tax rate τ, transfer T and the
fraction x of beneﬁciaries as exogenous. Since the distribution Φ of leisure valuations
has full support, there exists a critical valuation of leisure β∗, such that individuals
3This formulation allows for the possibility that the stigma depends only on the fraction of the
population z of “undeserving” welfare recipients, granted the unemployment rate ρ i sk n o w nb yt h e
individuals.
4This speciﬁcation can be shown to be consistent with Cobb-Douglas preferences over consump-
tion, leisure and norm adherence.Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics 4
with lower (higher) leisure valuations strictly prefer to (not) look for a job. This











The population share of individuals who look for a job thus equals Φ(β∗). In
view of the size of the population — here treated as a continuum — we assume that
the resulting population share of employed with probability one equals the expected
share, (1 − ρ)Φ(β∗). Hence:
x =1− (1 − ρ)Φ(β
∗). (3)
The utility weight γ attached to norm adherence is assumed to depend on current
or past population shares of transfer recipients. We study two polar cases. In the
ﬁrst, γ depends only on the current population share of transfer recipients: γ = g (x)
for some function g. We refer to this case as instantaneous stigma. In the second
case, there is a lag in the stigma. In this lagged stigma case, there is a sequence of
election periods in which the tax rate and per-capita transfer are determined, and
the current stigma depends only on the population share of transfer recipients in the
preceding period: γt = h(xt−1) for some function h. We study political equilibrium
in each of these two model speciﬁcations.
3. Instantaneous stigma
In the case of instantaneous stigma, the utility weight attached to norm adherence
is endogenous and instantaneous, given by γ = g (x), where g :[ 0 ,1] → R+ is
continuously diﬀerentiable with g  ≤ 0. Note that this makes the critical valuation of
leisure β∗, deﬁned in (2), a function of x. A proﬁle of individual choices — whether or
not to look for a job — thus constitutes a Nash equilibrium if and only if the resulting
share x of transfer recipients satisﬁes the ﬁxed-point equation
x = F (x), (4)
where F :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] is deﬁned by (3) as F (x)=1− (1 − ρ)Φ[β∗(x)]. We note
that, given τ<1 and T>0, the function F is continuous. Therefore, it has at
least one ﬁxed point for any given policy (τ,T). Moreover, since F is non-decreasing,
there is a priori a possibility of multiple equilibria.5 In sum: to every combination of
tax-rate τ and per-capita transfer T there exists at least one Nash equilibrium.
5A similar ﬁxed-point equation was used in Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999).Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics 5
Some or all of the Nash equilibria associated with a given policy (τ,T) may result
in a budget surplus or deﬁcit. In this simple model, the government budget is balanced





We refer to a tax-transfer pair (τ,T)a sabalanced policy if equation (5) is met for
some x satisfying equation (4). Hence, (τ,T) ∈ P =( 0 ,1) × (0,+∞) is a balanced



















This equation deﬁnes the subset P0 ⊂ P of balanced policies. It is easily veriﬁed that
for every τ there exists at least one T such that (τ,T) ∈ P0. The set P0 of balanced
policies deﬁnes a Laﬀer curve reﬂecting the inﬂuence of both economic incentives and
social norms.
What policy will emerge in this economy? We call a balanced policy a political
equilibrium policy (or an unbeatable policy) if no other balanced policy can defeat
it by strict majority in a binary vote. We focus on the voting scenario in which
all individuals know their own “type” β, and voting takes place before they decide
whether or not to look for a job.
For the purpose of analyzing voting decisions, we identify the expected utility
Uβ (τ,T) for an individual of type β under any balanced policy (τ,T). This is obtained
directly from equations (1) and (5):
Uβ (τ,T)=m a x
￿






In other words, if an individual of type β considers some balanced-budget policy,
(τ,T) — proposed, for instance, by a political candidate — then this individual expects
the population share of transfer recipients to be x = τ/(τ + T), by equation (5).
In this anticipated Nash equilibrium, the individual will choose the better of the
two alternatives available, that is, to look for a job or to live oﬀ the transfer. The
corresponding expected utility levels are then given by the ﬁrst and second elements
of the set on the right hand side. The ex ante expected utility to the individual of
type β is thus expressed by equation (7).
It is straightforward to show that, like in the median-voter theorem, a policy is a
political equilibrium policy if and only if it is an ideal policy for the individual with
the median valuation of leisure - a policy which maximizes that individual’s expected
utility as deﬁned in equation (7).6
6Consider an individual whose leisure parameter β is the median of the distribution Φ, andSocial Norms and Welfare State Dynamics 6
3.1. Example. Suppose g (x)=e x p [ −(x/a)b] for a>0a n db>1, and suppose
Φ(z)=( 1+e x p [ −c(z − d)])
−1 for c,d > 0. The median βm of Φ thus is βm = d.
Figures 1a and 1b depict the set P0 of balanced policies - the Laﬀer curve - in two
cases (for a =0 .3, b =5 ,c =3 ,d =0 .5, ρ =0 .2, and a =0 .3, b =1 0 ,c =3 ,
d =0 .1, ρ =0 .2, respectively). As one follows the Laﬀer curve from a low tax rate
to higher rates, the share of beneﬁciaries ﬁrst increases slowly because of the strong
work norm. However, as this share approaches about 20 percent of the population,
the norm begins to erode strongly, whereupon the Laﬀer curve folds and lands on a
lower level. For tax rates in this latter interval there exist three equilibria, with the
equilibrium with the highest per-capita transfer corresponding to the lowest share of
transfer recipients - and the strongest work norm. In Figure 1b the work norm has
been given a greater utility weight, and is more sensitive to changes in the number
of beneﬁciaries than in the case depicted in 1a.
The graphs also show indiﬀerence curves for the median individual. The non-
monotonic shape of these curves reﬂects that the median individual either participates
in the labour market (the upward sloping segments to the left in the graphs) or
chooses to be a beneﬁciary (the segments to the right in the graphs). The curve that
is tangent to the Laﬀer curve corresponds to the highest expected utility achievable
under any balanced-budget policy. In the political equilibrium policy in Figure 1a,
the tax rate is about 12% and the beneﬁt about 0.42. (Recall that the gross wage
rate is normalized to 1.) In Figure 1b the corresponding numbers are approximately
17% and 0.63. The graphs illustrate that when work norms are strong, beneﬁts can
be raised considerably with only a modest increase in the tax rate.
4. Lagged stigma
In the preceding section, we assumed that the intensity of the social norm adjusts
instantaneously to the population share of beneﬁciaries. However, adjustments in the
intensity of social norms are likely to exhibit some inertia. This might tempt people
to vote for higher beneﬁts than when the intensity adjusts instantaneously. Under
such inertia, relatively high transfers can be supported by modest tax rates in the
short run. Political equilibrium in the short run may, however, lead to subsequent
changes in the intensity of social norms. This suggests the possibility of a sequence
of short-term equilibria. It also raises the question of whether there exist long-term
steady-states for such sequences temporary political equilibria.
Consider a sequence of discrete time periods t, where the tax rate τt and transfer
Tt are determined at the outset of each period by way of majority vote. We assume
let (τm,T m)b ea nideal policy for this individual. It is straightforward to show that this policy is
unbeatable under majority rule, and that if (τ￿,T￿) is a political equilibrium policy, then it must be
an ideal policy for the median individual.Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics 7
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Figure 1: Political equilibria with instantaneous norm adjustment.
that the stigma in the current period depends on the population share of transfer
recipients in the preceding period, xt−1,t h a ti s ,γt = h(xt−1) for some function
h.7 Hence, the utility weight attached to norm adherence is now exogenous in each
period — ”inherited” from the equilibrium outcome in the preceding period. One
interpretation is that while each generation’s perception of the work norm is constant
over time the norm may change as new generations enter.8 We assume that h has the
same qualitative properties as g. Suppose, for simplicity, that all other parameters
are the same in all periods.
In the lagged model, a proﬁle of individual choices constitutes a Nash equi-
librium in period t if and only if the resulting population share xt satisﬁes xt =
1−(1 − ρ)Φ[αln [(1 − τt)/Tt]+γt/(1 −ρ)] where γt is a constant in period t.A si n
the preceding section, budget balance requires that xt = τt/(τt +Tt). Hence, we refer













7In this respect, the lagged version of our model is similar to LNW section VII, and to the model
in Kandori (2002), where there is a disutility associated with deviating from the median eﬀort level
of others in the preceding period.
8This could be perceived as a sequence of overlapping generations, where each generation lives
for two periods, as ”children” in the ﬁrst period, and as voters and workers in the second. The
assumed lag would simply mean that preferences are completely formed during childhood.Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics 8
This condition deﬁnes the set Pt (xt−1) ⊂ P of balanced policies in period t, condi-
tional on the share xt−1 of transfer recipients in the preceding period . Again, we
conclude that for every tax-rate τt ∈ (0,1) there exists at least one Tt such that
(τt,T t) ∈ Pt (xt−1). Generically, this ”lagged Laﬀer curve” coincides with the ”instan-
taneous Laﬀer curve” at only three points: at the boundary points where τt → 0 and
→ 1, respectively, and at the tax rate in the preceding period, that is, when τt = τt−1.9
Note that the lagged Laﬀer curve at this point is steeper than the instantaneous Laf-
fer curve. Assuming continuous diﬀerentiability, this follows straightforwardly from
implicit diﬀerentiation of conditions (6) and (8).
In the same spirit as before, we call a balanced policy (τt,T t)apolitical equilibrium
policy, given the share of transfer recipients in the preceding period, if no other
balanced policy can defeat it in a binary majority vote. The expected utility for an
individual of type β under any balanced policy (τ,T)i np e r i o dt, given xt−1,i s
Vβ (τ,T,xt−1) = max{(1 − ρ)(αln(1 −τ) − β)+ραlnT, αlnT − h(xt−1)} . (9)
Clearly, also with a lagged stigma, a policy is a political equilibrium if and only if
it is an ideal policy for the individual with the median valuation of leisure.10 This
deﬁnition of political equilibrium is a short-term concept in the sense that it treats
the stigma - the disutility of defecting from the work norm - as a constant, while this
may change from period to period.
This raises the question of a steady-state, or stationary, political equilibrium in
the lagged model, that is, a political equilibrium such that next period’s stigma will
be the same as in the current period. Following LNW (section VII), we deﬁne a
long-run political equilibrium in the lagged model as a political equilibrium (τt,T t)i n
the lagged model, given xt−1, such that h(xt)=h(xt−1). If h is strictly decreasing,
this requires xt = xt−1, that is, the policy has to be a balanced policy also in the
model with instantaneous stigma. At such a point the instantaneous Laﬀer curve
intersects the lagged Laﬀer curve, and the median individual’s maximal indiﬀerence
curve is tangential to the latter.
4.1. Example. Consider the same parametric speciﬁcation as in Figure 1a (in-
cluding h = g). Moreover, suppose that the policy in the preceding period was the
political equilibrium policy in that example: τt−1 ≈ 0.12, Tt−1 ≈ 0.42, and hence
xt−1 ≈ 0.22. Figure 2a shows a close-up of Figure 1a around this point. The dashed
curve through this point is a segment of the lagged Laﬀer curve. The graph also
9If τt = τt−1,t h e nw em a ys e tTt = Tt−1, in which case budget balance requires xt = xt−1.
10Here this is a policy which maximizes that individual’s expected utility, deﬁned as in equation
(7), but now with g(τ/(τ +T)) replaced by h(xt−1).Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics 9
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Figure 2: Short-run (2a) and long-run (2b) political equilibria with lagged norm
adjustment.
contains indiﬀerence curves of the median individual. As expected, the political equi-
librium policy in period t in the lagged model, represented by the tangency between
the lagged Laﬀer curve and the dashed indiﬀerence curve, results in more generous
transfers than when the stigma adjusts instantaneously. With a constant stigma, a
given increase in beneﬁts leads to a smaller increase in the number of beneﬁciaries.
Figure 2b depicts the long-run equilibrium where the indiﬀerence curve is tangent
the lagged Laﬀer curve where it intersects the instantaneous Laﬀer curve. At this
point, both the tax rate and the beneﬁt level are higher than in the equilibrium with
instantaneous adjustment of the norm.
Now, consider the eﬀect of a small macroeconomic shock. Speciﬁcally, suppose the
unemployment risk ρ increases by 3 percentage points in the example in Figure 1b
(where the norm is highly sensitive to the number of beneﬁciaries). As can be seen
from the instantaneous Laﬀer curve in Figure 3a, the scope for providing generous
beneﬁts is considerably reduced by the shock (c.f. Figure 1 b). The political equi-
librium policy after the shock and with instantaneous norm adjustment is τ ≈ 0.17
and T ≈ 0.48. It can be shown that the political equilibrium in the lagged version
of the example in Figure 1b is close to the instantaneous political equilibrium. The
reason is that the lagged Laﬀer curve almost coincides with the instantaneous Laﬀer
curve at that point, since norm adherence is almost complete. This is, however, not
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Figure 3: Short-run and long-run political equilibria after an unemployment shock.
the political equilibrium with instantaneous adjustment, then next period’s political
equilibrium in the lagged model would involve a higher tax rate and beneﬁt level.
But this is only the ﬁrst step in a dynamic adjustment process in a sequence of elec-
tion periods. As illustrated by the dotted path in Figure 3c, tracing out a sequence
tangency points between lagged Laﬀer curves and indiﬀerence curves of the median
individual, this process converges to a political equilibrium far from the instantaneous
political equilibrium. In this steady-state equilibrium of the lagged model, τ ≈ 0.15
and T ≈ 0.2, and hence xt−1 ≈ 0.43. At that point, the inﬂuence of the norm has
basically disappeared, and, as a result, the lagged and instantaneous Laﬀer curves
approximately coincide.
Suppose now that the unemployment risk ρ returns to the pre-shock level. The
lagged Laﬀer curve, conditional on the inherited population share xt−1 ≈ 0.43 of
beneﬁciaries, coincides with the segment of the Laﬀer curve in Figure 1b where work
norms have no inﬂuence. The lagged political equilibrium then occurs at the tangency
point between this curve and the median individual’s indiﬀerence curve. In this sense,
the model exhibits hysteresis.11
5. Concluding Remark
We have shown how social norms against living oﬀ handouts from the government
may mitigate free riding on income-insurance systems. Our analysis assumes rational
11Kandori (2002) also derives hysteresis properties in a model where work norms and economic
incentives interact. However, the dynamic in that paper diﬀers from that in this paper. In Kandori’s
model, a sequence of stochastic shocks to individual choices probabilistically results in a reduction
i ne ﬀ o r to v e rt i m e .Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics 11
expectations, including the assumption that a possible time lag in the social norm is
correctly anticipated. It would be worth analysing the case when individuals do not
fully understand the dynamics of norm formation (for a heuristic discussion of this
issue, see Section VII in Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull, 1999).
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